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PRIVATIZING DISCIPLINE - THE CASE OF
MANDATORY DRUG TESTING
H.J. Glasbeek & D. McRobert
The authors discuss mandatory drug testing as an example
of an employer's exercise of control over employees and one
which should be questioned because of the level of intrusiveness
on the individuaL For the authors arguments based on concerns
with violation of civil liberties and the unreliability of the testing
procedures mask the real issue involved with mandatory drug
testing. That issue is the use by employers and, as a class, private
property owners of private power to discipline and punish in
a way that Foucault has argued the state does on behalf of
the rulers of society.
La privatisation de la discipline: le cas des tests
obligatoires pour le depistage de drogues
L'article discute les tests obligatoires pour le depistage de
drogues; il y voit un nouvel exemple du pouvoir que l'employeur
exerce sur les employes. Mais si cet exercice de pouvoir a itj
critique comme excessif parce que constituant une inggrence dans
la vie personnelle, les presents auteurs trouvent que tout argument
base sur la violation des libertes civiques ou sur le manque de
fiabilii des tests ne ser qub'i masquer la question veritable: b
savoir, l'usage par l'employeur, et par toute la classe des pro-
pritaires, d'un pouvoir priv de discipline et de punition, pouvoir
pareil a celui exerce par l'Etat, selon Foucault, au profit des
dirigeants du pays.
1. INTRODUCTION
In August 1986, Nancy and Ronald Reagan created something
of a furor when they declared they were going to start a "war
on drugs".1 The abuse of drugs by famous baseball players and
other sports stars, accompanied by some highly publicized dramatic
deaths, 2 heightened anxieties and concerns about the use and/or
abuse of drugs in America. President Reagan suggested that all
employees or, at the very least, all public sector ones, be subjected
* H.J. Glasbeek, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
D. McRobert, LL.M. Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
Abbie Hoffman (with Jonathan Silvers) - Steal This Urine Test; Fighting
Drug Hysteria in America - (New York: Penguin, 1987) rather cattily
remarked that Nancy Reagan, lambasted for her personal extravagances, "was
anxious to shed her Marie-Antoinette image" and came up with her campaign
to "just say no"; 14-15; see also Globe and Mail, Aug. 8, 1986, Al, A2.
2 Among the more prominent cases was that of Leonard Bias, a U.S. college
basketball star drafted by the Boston Celtics in 1986; Time, July 7, 1986,
75.
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to urinalyses.3 Other members of his cabinet were encouraged to
follow the President's example and also give a sample of their urine.
As Stroud noted, there was a veritable outbreak of "patriotic
unzippings".4 Time and Newsweek both felt compelled to run cover
stories about the use and abuse of drugs in the United States.5 The
National Institute on Drug Abuse released figures which purported
to show that 23 million Americans regularly use some kinds of
proscribed drugs and that 3 million of them could be described
as having developed dependency on such drugs. 6 This gave the
Administration's claims credibility. Government's spending to fight
the "war on drugs" was increased sharply, while its calls for cutting
the deficit remained shrill and loud.7
Much in the same way as Toronto publicizes its (low) murder
rate to compete with the cities of Detroit and Buffalo for the cachet
of being a truly big, bad, sophisticated urban centre, Canadians
seem to feel the need to believe that they face as much of a drug
problem as Americans do. In September 1986 Prime Minister
Mulroney asserted that there was a true epidemic of drug taking
in Canada and declared his own "war on drugs".8 Sport Canada
announced that athletes should undergo more stringent drug testing. 9
Very soon Canadians were as mesmerized as were their counterparts
in the United States and, by November 1986, a Gallup Poll showed
that 75% of Canadians thought that there was a drug epidemic
in this country and that two out of three Canadians favoured
mandatory drug testing for important people such as teachers and
politicians.10
The fever in the United States had its predictable (and, we guess,
its intended) effect. The trend towards even more employer man-
dated drug testing was given a boost. Between 1982 and 1985
the percentage of employers listed on Fortune's leading 500 com-
panies requiring employees to undergo drug testing had already
increased from 3 to 30.11 It now has been estimated that up to
50% of U.S. employers will be imposing drug tests on their employees
in the near future.' 2 In Canada, employers have evinced less interest
Dougherty, "Drug Testing: America's New Work Ethic" (1986), 15 Stetson
LR, 883.
4 Carsten Stroud, "Do What's Fair," Canadian Business, Apr. 1987, 69-70,
101-103.
5 Time, Sept. 15, 1986; Newsweek, Aug. 11, 1986.
6 Bureau of National Affairs, Alcohol and Drugs in the Workplace: Costs, Controls
and Controversies. (Washington: BNA, 1986).
7 S. Wisotsky, "Crackdown: The Emerging 'Drug Exception' to the Bill of
Rights" (1987), 38 Hastings LJ. 889.
8 Globe and Mai Sept. 18, 1986, A5.
9 Sport Canada, Fitness and Amateur Sport Policy on Drug Use and Doping
Control in Sport. (Ottawa, 1986).
10 Toronto Star, Nov. 3, 1986, A7.
II Noel Dunivant and Associates, Drug Testing in Major Corporations: A Survey
of the Fortune 500 (1986). Cited in U.S. News and World Report, July 28,
1986, 51.
12 The Toronto Star, Dec. 14, 1987, A.16.
Vol 9
Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice
in subjecting their employees to mandatory drug testing. The
indications are that only about 30 employers, including such
important ones as Air Canada and Canadian National, have such
programmes. 13 And, while the pressure to promote the testing of
employees continues' 4, there are indications that even some of the
employers now testing are losing their zeal for the enterprise. Fairly
recently, American Motors discontinued its practice of testing would-
be employees 5 and limitations have been imposed at Air Canada
in respect of the kind of employees who are to be subjected to
drug testing.' 6 In a similar vein, the federal Minister for Health
and Welfare, Mr. Epp, has suggested that there really is no evidence
that Canada is blighted by an epidemic of drug abuse, 17 contradicting
his Prime Minister's earlier assertion. Yet, despite the general muting
of the clamour for drug control by employers, the issue remains
a high profile one, one which has given rise to very serious public
debate.
In the last two years, the Canadian Centre of Occupational Health
and Safety has had both a workshop and a conference on the issue18 ;
the Canadian Bar Association, Ontario Branch, has deliberated and
issued a very widely circulated report' 9 ; the Addiction Research
Foundation has produced a report and a set of recommendations, 20
as has the Health and Welfare Committee of the House of Com-
mons 21, and the Ontario Human Rights Commission has made a
policy statement,22 as has the former federal Human Rights Com-
missioner, Mr. Gordon Fairweather. 23 More recently, Transport
Canada released a report containing recommendations in respect
'3 Toronto Star, Aug. 1, 1987, A2; The Toronto Star Nov. 5, 1986, A2.
"4 Toronto Star, Aug. 1, 1987, A2.
15 Toronto Star, Dec. 5, 1987, A3.
16 But, at the same time, there are some indications to the contrary; see Task
Force on the Control of Drug and Alcohol Abuse in Railway Operations,
Alcohol and Drugs in the Railway Industry (Ottawa: Transport Canada, Surface
Group, 1988).
17 Globe and Mail, Nov. 25, 1987, A13. At the time of writing, however,
following the drama of a drug-related death of a teenager in Toronto, there
is renewed alarm about the size of Canada's drug problem. And the even
more recent Olympic drug controversies, while not directly related to the
drugs-in-the-street scene, has added much fuel to the burning fires.
18 Workshop on Drug Testing in the Workplace, Hamilton, Ontario, June 9 and
10, 1987 (Hamilton: CCOHS, 1987); Drug Testing in the Workplace: A
Conference, Hamilton, Ontario, Dec. 3, 1987 (Hamilton: CCHOS, 1987).
19 Report on Mandatory Drug Testing, (Toronto: July 1987).
20 Employee Related Drug Screening : A Public Health and Safety Perspective,
(Toronto 1987). The recommendations are found in a section of the report
entitled "Best Advice".
21 House of Commons Standing Committee on National Health and Welfare,
Booze, Pills and Dope: Reducing Substance Abuse in Canada, (Ottawa: Supply
and Services, 1987).
22 Policy on Drug and Alcohol Testing, Oct. 23, 1987.
23 Globe and Mail, May 28, 1987, A18.
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of drug testing in the transportation industry. 24 Given the relative
rarity of employer-mandated drug testing in Canada, the question
is raised: why has the issue attracted so much attention and why
does it continue to do so? This article addresses that question.
In part, the answer may lie in Canada's proximity to the United
States where the drive toward mandatory drug testing of employees
remains in high gear and the wider issue of control of drug abuse
in society continues to attract attention. In part, of course, the issue
is a sexy one because of the nature of drug testing. Standard drug
testing techniques necessitate physical intrusion. This triggers an
instinctive reaction that there is something inherently wrong with,
something fundamentally unacceptable about, this kind of imposed
testing. In this article we will argue that, in addition to these important
factors, the issue is a controversial one because the idea that
employees might be subjected to drug tests which are mandated
by employers brings into sharp focus the hollowness of some of
the conventional assumptions made about the nature of our political
economy. Specifically, inasmuch as it is widely assumed that the
real threat to freedom is the inability to control an omnipotent
state and that all our efforts to protect and to further our liberties
ought to be directed at holding this leviathan in check, employer-
mandated drug testing draws attention to the fact that the private
power of property owners may well be a more significant fetter
on freedom and democracy. And, once attention is drawn to this
possibility, it becomes manifest that the distinction between the
private and the public, between the economic and the political,
is not as stark in advanced capitalist economies as liberal pluralist
theorists - especially lawyers - would have us believe.
Indeed, it may become apparent that the maintenance of the
distinction obscures real power relations. We feel, thus, that the
drug testing issue has led to a dim perception of alternative and
frightening visions of our polity. We want to argue that it is this
which has led (often unconsciously) to attempts to present the issue
as one which does not threaten the assumptions of a consensual
society and that these attempts are not convincing, not even to
those who make them, resulting in observable unease and anxiety.
Rather, an employer's insistence that he is entitled to subject
employees or would-be employees to compulsory drug testing is
no more than a manifestation, though a vivid one, of the power
possessed by employers - by those who constitute the ruling class
- over the subordinate classes, that is, over labour.
This assumes that capital and labour are engaged in a continuing
class struggle which can take some very ugly forms. This proposition
is not normally acceded to by politicians, scholars, or by the public
at large. Our institutional arrangements hide the class-based nature
of employment relations' struggles. We have created elaborate
mechanisms which give the appearance that conflicts between
employers and employees are merely disputes between parties who
share an ideology. That is, our institutions and conventional
24 Supra note 16.
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standard-bearers define, characterize and seek to resolve such
disputes as if they were momentary tensions which arise between
parties who accept a framework within which their differences are
reconcilable. 25
In the drug testing arena this papering-over of the essential nature
of capital-labour conflict, that is, of the real nature of the relations
of production, is taking place almost automatically, reflexively.
Employers do not claim that their right to test their employees
for the presence of drugs in their bodies is merely an exercise of
the power which inheres in their control over property. They do
not seek to justify their claim as being one of right, one which
is naturally and properly bestowed on the superior party in a superior-
subordinate relationship.26 Rather, they justify their claim to be
permitted to test their employees on the basis that they are striving
to achieve accepted (read shared) goals and/or on the basis of
promoting the welfare of the general public. As a consequence,
the drug testing debate is reduced to questions such as whether
or not the available drug testing techniques can lead to the realization
of these "shared" goals and values, and whether or not the means
to be employed (subjugation of human beings to testing, the use
of intrusive methodologies such as urinalysis, the conduct of
unwonted inquiries into private lifestyles of employees) are justified
by the achievement of shared social goals.
The debate becomes concerned primarily with (i), the scientific
validity of the tests and with (ii), their effect on the civil rights
of employees. Discussions of these issues have come to be dominated
by technocrats, whether they be occupational health and safety
experts or professional civil libertarians, such as lawyers. We will
argue that the reason for the public anxiety over drug testing is
to be found in the fact that the working of the mediating mechanisms,
such as occupational health and safety regimes and civil rights'
schemes, as well as the arguments of technocrats and scholars who
are the traditional intellectual gate keepers for the ruling classes,
lack persuasive power and conviction. Inasmuch as the object of
such mediation and of the intellectual and technocratic advocacy
is to neutralize the potential of the struggle over employer-mandated
drug testing to reveal the true ambit of the power of private employers
25 See P. Weiler - Reconcilable Differences (Toronto: Carswell, 1980). Weiler
is the modem standard bearer of this school. He is the successor to B. Laskin
and H.W. Arthurs in Canada who, in turn, were the heirs of the movement
in the U.S. headed by Dunlop, Landis, Frankfurter, Aaron, Cox, Chamberlain
and Kuhn, et al. For a more detailed discussion, see Glasbeek, "Voluntarism,
Liberalism, and Grievance Arbitration; Holy Grail, Romance and Life," in
G. England (ed.) Essays in Labour Law (C.C.H.: Don Mills, 1986), 219.
26 As with the phrase "reconcilable differences", the language of "superior-
subordinate" is taken from the lexicon of Canadian liberal pluralist scho-
larship; see, Privy Council Office, The Report of the Task Force on Labour
Relations (The Woods' Commission)(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1968), which
referred to the natural "superior-subordinate nexus inherent in the employer-
employee relationships" and supported the means in use which helped
maintain this hierarchical relationship; see paras. 291 et seq.
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over their employees, it is not achieved. If we are right, a question
arises as to why it is that employer-mandated drug testing is being
promoted at all, given its potential for creating disharmony while
promising very little by way of substantial gains. We will offer
a speculative response. It is that drug testing is but a manifestation
of the increasing general tendency to privatize the disciplining of
the workforce.
2. Some Established Employers' Rights
We begin by putting the employers' claim to be able to impose
drug testing on their employees into a context of analogous existing
legal rights of employers. What follows is a sketch of apposite
employer power in circumstances where workers have been able
to withstand employer strength best, that is, where they have had
the benefit of collective bargaining. Among numerous employer
rights, consider the following:
(i) Unless there is something explicitly to the contrary in a
collective agreement, an employer may insist that an em-
ployee work overtime. 27 Arbitral jurisprudence has been
developed which holds that an employer can only make
reasonable demands of overtime. It turns out that the
requirement to act reasonably is not one which fetters the
employer unduly. For instance, in one case an employee
was asked to work overtime on the week-end on which
his long awaited wedding celebration was to be held. As
many visitors were to come, some from overseas, the event
had been planned for many months. In the circumstances,
it was held that the employer's insistence on overtime was
unreasonable. In the same hearing, the arbitration board
had to deal with a situation in which an employee, asked
to work overtime, was disciplined for refusing to do so
because he had long-standing plans to attend a much
anticipated motorcycle race. He had made a deposit to
reserve his seat. It was held that the employer's request
was reasonable and that it had been appropriate to discipline
the refusing employee.2 8 In short, the employer's right to
interfere with the employee's non-working life is curtailed,
but far from abrogated.
(ii) Employers may discipline their employees for misconduct
away from work. Thus, while drunkenness away from the
work place will not automatically be a ground for discipline,
27 Algoma Steel Corp. Ltd (1960), 11 L.A.C. 118 (Anderson); Massey-Harris
Co. Ltd (Toronto) (1952), 4 L.A.C. 1227 (Cowan); Northern Electric Co.
Ltd. (1965), 16 L.A.C. 22 (Little); Kimberley-Clark of Canada (1973), 3
L.A.C. (2d) 278 (H.D. Brown). The employer's right is limited by statute,
eg., The Employment Standards Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, Part IV. The need
for such legislation indicates the inherent power accorded the employer by
contract and collective bargaining jurisprudence in respect of determining
the length of the working day.
28 Cryovac Division, Grace Chemicals Ltd. (1972), 24 L.A.C. 127 (Weiler).
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it may be where the employer's reputation is adversely
affected by it.29 Again, where an employee uses proscribed
drugs in a recreational way this may not be an adequate
ground for discipline 30 but, where an employee is found
to be in possession of a relatively large amount of such
proscribed drugs in non-working time and/or is suspected
of trafficking in drugs, an employer is entitled to discipline
such an employee.31
(iii) An employer may discipline an employee if she drinks on
the job.32
(iv) An employee who engages in business activities which are
somewhat similar to that of his employer but does so on
his own time, may be subjected to the employer's discipline,
and this may be true even if it turns out that he is not
in direct competition with his employer.33 In such cases,
an employee, once again, is being controlled in respect of
her/his conduct away from work.
(v) An employer may be able to discipline an employee if the
employee failed to disclose pertinent misconduct of fellow
employees. 34
(vi) An employer may be able to discipline an employee who,
upon application for the job, failed to disclose prior pertinent
misconduct.35
(vii) An employer may discipline a worker who is suspected of,
or charged with, an unlawful act on or off the employer's
premises. 36 As in all the immediately preceding cases, there
are limits on the employer's right, but what we are describing
here is the inherent right of the employer to discipline in
such cases.
(viii) An employer may discipline employees for fighting with
supervisory personnel, even if such fighting takes place
during off-duty hours.37
29 Windsor Utilities Commission (1958), 8 L.A.C. 328 (Hanrahan).
30 Air Canada (1975), 10 L.A.C. (2d) 346 (Morin).
31 Air Canada (1973), 5 L.A.C. (2d) (Andrews). The employee was an aircraft
maintenance mechanic. The closer the relationship between drug use/abuse
and the welfare of others, the easier it is to accept the employer's exercise
of power. But note that the logic is the same when the links are not so
obvious. In any event, the employer's enterprise and property is also entitled
to be protected and always is when the welfare of others is being invoked
as a justification for the exercise of employer power.
32 See, generally, Brown and Beatty - Canadian Labour Arbitration (2ed.),
(Agincourt: Canada Law Book, 1984), para. 7:3560.
33 Gray's Department Stores Ltd (1973), 4 L.A.C. (2d) I l1 (Palmer).
34 MoffatsLtd. (1966), 17 L.A.C. 72 (Arnell);Sooke Forest Products Ltd. (1968),
68 D.L.R. (2d) 432.
35 For a discussion of the authorities, see Gould Manufacturing of Canada
Ltd. (1972), 1 L.A.C. (2d) 314 (Shime).
36 Phillips Cables ltd (1974), 5 L.A.C. (2d) 274 (Adams).
37 Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada Ltd. (1975), 9 L.A.C. (2d) 345
(Mason).
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(ix) An employer can always discipline an employee for insolent
and insubordinate behaviour. 38
(x) An employer may be able to use electronic surveillance
techniques to observe workers at their work station, and
when going in and out of the premises. 39
(xi) An employer can regulate the amount of conversation during
work hours, or draft rules which prevent employees leaving
their work station until a replacement worker has been
found.40
(xii) An employer may be entitled to open lockers to check them
and the belongings of the employees which are found
therein. 41
While none of the above disciplinary powers which employers
are able to claim are absolute, they are considered to be inherent
in employment relationships. We will now look at the way that
employers make the claim that they have a right to impose
mandatory drug testing on their employees and compare these
arguments to those on which they rest their acknowledged dis-
ciplinary powers.
Employers will claim the right to test their employees for drug
use on the basis that this:
(i) will prevent the danger of harm to other workers in the
work place;
(ii) will prevent major accidents or the creation of risk to the
public;
(iii) will help the employer protect his property;
(iv) will diminish interference with productivity;
(v) will protect workers from their own follies, that is, from
drug-use which will affect their immediate safety and long-
range health;
(vi) will lessen the cost of compensation premiums which may
have to be paid as a result of accidents and ill-health caused
by the use of drugs; and
(vii) will act as an indicator of whether the incidence of drug
use is caused by unacceptable conditions in the workplace.
These justifications for the imposition of drug testing on employees
are of the same nature as those which sanction the employer's
acknowledged rights to discipline employees in the ways set out
above. In particular, note that an employer is entitled to discipline
employees who present a potential of harm to fellow employees
38 See, generally, Brown and Beatty, supra note 32, paras. 7:3660, 7:3610,
7:3612.
39 Puretex Knitting Co. Ltd. (1979), 23 L.A.C. (2d) 14 (Ellis).
40 This was the situation for automobile workers depicted in the film "Final
Offer", shown on CBC; see also D. Wells, "Autoworkers on the Firing Line"
in C. Heron & R. Storey (eds.), On the Job; Confronting the Labour Process
in Canada (Kingston, Montreal: McGill-Queen's U.P., 1986), 327.
41 Canadian Union of Postal Workers, Calgary Local 710 v. Canada Post
Corporation, [1987] 5 W.W.R. 262 (Alta. Q.B.).
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or to the property of the employer. This is reflected in the rules
concerned with the right to discipline for misconduct away from
work; for failure to disclose the misconduct of fellow employees;
for failure to disclose their own prior misconduct; for being under
suspicion of, or for being charged with, unlawful acts; for fighting;
for insolence and for insubordination; for stealing, and so forth.
Inasmuch as the claim to test for the presence of drugs in an
employee's system is premised on the idea that fellow workers,
property and production must be protected, there is an obvious
symmetry between the reasoning justifying that claim and that which
justifies already universally accepted employer rights to discipline.
In addition, note that employers already have been given the power
to make sure that the performance of workers will be acceptable
and safe. To this end they have been allowed to require employees
to submit to medical examinations. 42
The parallel, then, is easily discernible: the claim that an employer
should be able to impose drug tests on his workforce is grounded
in the same way as is his right to protect his productive activities
by insisting on obedience and on conforming behaviour. The essence
of this employer right is traceable to the fact that it is understood
that the employer should be able to manage his business in the
way that he sees fit, precisely because it is his business. Any
curtailment of this accepted employer power is seen as an incursion
on a natural right and, therefore, as a constraint which ought to
be limited. This explains the existing arbitral jurisprudence which,
as we have seen, fetters employers a little, but leaves their ultimate
control largely undisturbed. 43 We can expect this also to be the
approach when the issue is the new one of drug testing. But, because
drug testing is justified largely on the basis that it has to do with
the health and safety of workers and of the public, this will be
somewhat obscured.
It has become the dominant wisdom that occupational health
and safety matters should be analyzed and discussed on the basis
that they constitute shared problems of employers and employees.
While our legislative schemes impose a set of positive duties on
employers and employees, provide for the proscription and reg-
ulation of toxic substances by outside bodies, all of which is to
be bolstered by a government-run inspectorate and enforcement
system, these regimes also insist on collaboration between employers
and employees to make sure that the health and safety conditions
which are acceptable to them and to society are maintained. Joint
42 Monarch Fine Foods Co. Ltd. (1978) 20 L.A.C. (2d) 419 (M. Picher); B.P.
Oil Ltd (1972), 24 L.A.C. 122 (Palmer); Lake Ontario Steel Co. Ltd. (1970),
22 L.A.C. 206 (Hanrahan).
43 For more detailed discussions of how unions can be given more of a role
in the running of the business without decreasing the employer's control
over the business, see H.J. Glasbeek, "Voluntarism, Liberalism and Grievance
Arbitration: Holy Grail, Romance and Real Life," supra note 25; see also
- H.J. Glasbeek, "The Utility of Model Building - Collins' Capitalist
Discipline and Corporatist Law" (1984), 13 Ind LJ. 133.
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health and safety committees become the linchpin of these schemes,
rather than standard-setting and direct enforcement. That this is
meant to be so can be gleaned from the political history of the
occupational health and safety systems. Both the creators of the
schemes and their assessors go to remarkable length to establish
the fact that health and safety issues are not questions of conflict,
are not questions which are to be resolved by confrontation. Rather,
the emphasis is that they are problems which arise out of production
and that both employers and employees have an interest in reducing
such risks. Thus, the Robens Report, an English evaluation which
has proved to be very influential in this part of the world, argued
that
... there is a greater identity of interest between "the two sides"
in relation to safety and health problems than in most other matters.
There is no legitimate scope for "bargaining" on safety and health
issues, but much scope for constructive discussion, joint inspection,
and participation in working out solutions.44
Professor Ham, in compiling the report which provided the blueprint
for Ontario's occupational health and safety legislative regime, wrote
that the "adamantly confrontational character of Canadian labour-
management relations had deterred the creation of sensible arrange-
ments for worker participation. Questions of health and safety are
not suitable issues for collective bargaining". 45 A subsequent inquiry
into mining safety evinced a similar attitude, 46 as did a labour
relations board.47 In fact, the mere suggestion that the issue of
occupational health and safety is one which requires machinery
aimed at controlling inherent conflict between the employers and
44 Report of the Committee on Safety and Health at Work 1970-72 (London:
H.M.S.O., 1972)(Robens Report), para. 66.
45 Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in
Mines (Ministry of Attorney-General, Ontario, 1976) (Ham Commission).
46 Report of the Joint Federal-Provincial Inquiry Commission into Safety in Mines
and Mining Plants in Ontario, "Towards Safe Production", (Burkett Report,
1981). At page 86, Burkett noted that these issues should be settled in a
co-operative and consultative manner and that a joint health and safety
committee system will function optimally if it "allows the parties to insulate
the health and safety effort from the more adversarial aspects of the
relationship". Some collective agreements emphasise the need to co-operate
rather than to fight about these matters, eg, the agreement between American
Motors (Canada) Inc. and U.A.W. Local No. 1285 (Sept. 1980) (as reproduced
in Tucker - Materials on Occupational Health and Safety - Toronto,
Osgoode Hall Law School, 1986, unpublished teaching materials, available
on request), provided that the parties agreed "to use their best efforts jointly
to achieve these objectives", the objectives being to bring about a safe work
environment by co-operation.
47 "Safety is not intended to be an adversarial issue. Life and limbs are not
intended to be negotiable items"; see United Steelworkers of America v.
Cominco Ltd (1980), 80 C.L.L.C., 16,045 (C.L.R.B.).
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the employees is rejected with vigour. Thus, when the Ontario
occupational health and safety scheme came under attack by workers
who believed that the emphasis on the internal responsibility system
(as the collaborative mechanism is called) meant that government
did not set tough enough standards and did not regulate and control
the workplace adequately, the response was that people should work
together to create a better environment, rather than ask for a system
of more aggressive external regulation and punitive enforcement:
At least some [workers and union activists] are ideologically
opposed to cooperative solutions and believe that the system must
be changed. They call for an expanded inspectorate, acting not as
monitors, mediators and problem solvers, but as policemen using
prosecutions as the major tool. Unfortunately, there is evidence that
members of this group have another agenda and are using occu-
pational health and safety to achieve other objectives. This is
particularly destructive, because finding acceptable solutions to
workplace hazards depends upon cooperation between labour, man-
agement and the regulatory authorities. 48
The message was clear: health and safety in the workplace should
not be regulated by devices which presumed that an irreconcilable
conflict between employers and employees had to be resolved.
Similarly, it has been asserted that, while the creation of joint health
and safety committees was designed to help the parties work together
to improve conditions, it was not meant to give workers more
decision-making power. Collaboration was the idea, but one which
envisaged that cooperative efforts were to take place in an un-
changed power setting, one in which health and safety came within
the prerogative of management unless management had bargained
it away.49
It follows that, if the drug testing controversy is viewed as an
aspect of occupational health and safety regulation, the issue of
whether employees should be subjected to drug testing also will
be seen as falling within the employer's prerogative unless there
is a positive indication to the contrary in a contract or in a statutory
provision. Such contrary contractual or legislative modifications may
evolve. As has been noted, not everything which falls within the
prerogative of management is automatically left as an unrestrained
employer power. Employees have been able to make gains at the
bargaining table and, sometimes, legislation or adjudicative type
decision-making has cut down the rawness of the property owners'
rights; for instance, as has been seen, the employer power to discipline
employees has been limited by the arbitral jurisprudence's require-
ment that the employer's demands and responses be somewhat
reasonable. Unsurprisingly, the argument about drug testing quickly
48 Report on the Administration of the Occupational Health and Safety Act,
(McKenzie-Laskin Report), (Toronto, Ministry of Labour, Ontario, January,
1987) Vol. 1, iii.
49 K. Swinton "Enforcement of Occupational Health and Safety Legislation:
The Role of the Internal Responsibility System" in K. Swan & K. Swinton
(eds.) - Studies in Labour Law. (Toronto: Butt., 1983), 143, 153.
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devolves into the following kind of debate: (i) drug testing involves
intrusive practices; (ii), should the employer be entitled to rely on
an unfettered right to so test, given that the results may not be
all that useful to him? That is, conceding the claim that drug testing
will lead to some improvement in respect of health and safety for
the employer's workers, as well as to some increase in productivity
and to some enhancement in the protection of the employer's
property, the employer still may have to show that drug testing
is a reasonable means to achieve these limited objectives, just as
he has to show that any disciplinary response he makes is reasonable
in view of his productive needs.
3. The Arguments About the Scientific Validity of Drug Tests
The drug testing which employers want to do requires the taking
of urine samples from employees or would-be employees. These
are to be subjected to tests to determine whether certain proscribed
substances are present in the tested person's system. There are a
whole series of techniques for urinalyses available to employers:
thin-layer chromatography (TLC); immunoassays (radio immuno-
assays - RIA -, enzyme multiplied immunoassay - EMIT -); gas
chromatography; gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GCMS);
high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC). We have listed
these in ascending order of accuracy. The first two named tests
are quick to do and cheap, but they are not very sensitive. While
they can identify the presence of some substances in the system,
they are not specific, that is, they are unable to differentiate between
a number of substances. Moreover, samples can be easily adulterated
and this can lead to mistaken results. RIA and EMIT are more
reliable tests. Even better is gas chromatography, especially when
combined with mass spectrometry. While these latter tests provide
much more reliable results, they require more skill to apply and
are far more costly. HPLC is a test which can ensure reliability
of results when other tests have been used. The more reliable
techniques are not only very costly, but they only permit testing
for one substance in the system at a time. This is a real drawback
for employers who do not know what they are looking for when
they set up their drug testing programme. As a result, some employers
now rely on a combination of tests to determine whether their
employees are using drugs.
While there is much contention in the literature about the accuracy
of each and every one of these tests50 , it is plausible to argue that,
if one of the better methodologies is used, drug testing for a particular
50 G. Atherley and S. Lampert, "Mandatory Drug Testing in the Workplace"
in Human Resources Management in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall Canada,
1986); H.J. Hansen, S. Candill and J. Boone, "Crisis in Drug Testing" (1985),
Vol. 253, No. 16, Jour. Amer. Med Assoc., 2382; S. Schnell and D. Lewis,
"Drug Screening in the Workplace: Pros and Cons" Seminars in Occupational
Medicine, Vol. 1., No. 4, Dec. 1986, 243.
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drug can lead to accurate results in the sense that it will reveal
whether or not a particular substance was in the tested subject's
system. Rigorous safeguards have to be instituted to ensure that
this much can be said. It must be made certain that the sample
which is tested is the sample which is actually being given in an
unadulterated form. That is, monitoring of the giving of the sample
may well have to be undertaken.-" Similarly, the chain of custody
of the sample, from the moment of its taking through to its testing
and the reporting back to the employer, must be safeguarded so
that no mistakes or adulterations can take place at any stage. And,
of course, the testing must be done scrupulously by people with
the expertise necessary to do the more complicated testing. But,
even if all these prerequisites are met, several problems will still
remain unresolved. The urinalysis
(i) may show that a particular drug was present in a person's
system;
(ii) will not show, with any degree of precision, when or how
a particular drug came to be in that person's system, that
is, whether by inhalation, injection or ingestion;
(iii) will not show whether the presence of the drugs in the person's
body means that the person was ever impaired (in terms of
work performance) and was, or is, a potential danger to other
people;
(iv) will not show whether the impairment, if any, was there at
any particular time or that there will be a similar impairment
at any future time;
(v) will not show how much of that drug needs to be present
in a particular individual to impair that person, as opposed
to any other person who might use the particular drug; and
(vi) will not eliminate the possibility that the positive test was
the result of the intake of substances which give a similar
reading, but which are not proscribed.
Given (a), that there is no guarantee that the employers will use
the best and most expensive drug testing technique, (b), that the
testing may not be done as expertly as it ought to be, and (c),
that there is no direct connection between finding the presence
of a particular drug and its impact on health and safety and on
production, there is a very good argument that mandated drug testing
by employers is not a reasonable exercise of employer prerogative.
Those who make this argument rely heavily on the fact that the
scientific studies which are produced by employers who think that
such drug testing is worthwhile are not all that reliable.
There are many studies which purport to show that drug testing
is very useful. For instance, there is a study which claims that
employees who have five drinks are likely to have twice as many
accidents as non-drinkers and that marijuana and cocaine users
51 For a vivid description of the embarrassment and humiliation this may cause,
see Susan Ager, "Ready, Set ... Will You Go?" Detroit Free Press, Nov.
30, 1986.
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have a 70% greater risk of falling prone to injury.52 In a self-reporting
study, 28% of drug dependent workers said that their injuries were
drug related, while of the 4% of the sample who took responsibility
for injuring another employee, one in four said the accident was
due to their usage of drugs. 53 But, such findings are controversial.
In a review of the scientific studies summarized by the Addiction
Research Foundation, Ellis is very scathing of the claims made
on the basis of the scientific tests which have been conducted. He
points out that where studies show that alcohol use is common
among workers, its relationship to occupational health and safety
injuries is not made out, but merely suggested. He notes that in
studies where death and injuries at work are said to be related
to drug usage, no control groups were employed to calculate rates
of death and injuries on the job among comparable non-drug users.
He bluntly calls this work unconvincing.54
Nonetheless, employers who have used drug testing argue that,
when they instituted such programmes, accidents were reduced
dramatically. It is these claims which led Time magazine to report
that drug abusers had three times the injury rate of other workers. 55
The Addiction Research Foundation has argued that alcohol and
drugs may play a role in up to 15% of accidents in the workplace
in Ontario.56 A large employer, the International Mineral and
Chemical Corporation, claimed that its introduction of a drug testing
programme at their Carlsbad operation in New Mexico had led
to a sharp reduction in accident claims. Further, after the institution
of the programme, the percentage of its workforce which tested
positive for drugs was reduced from 30% to 5%.57 In one of the
most discussed employer studies, that of the Georgia Power Com-
pany, the claim was that extensive drug testing led to a dramatic
reduction in the accident rate, from 5.4 per 2000 hours' work to
.48 per 2000 hours' work.58
52 R.W. Hingson, R.J. Lederman and S.C. Walsh, "Employee Drinking Patterns
and Accidental Injury: A Study of Four New England States" (1985), 46
J. Stud Alcohol, 298-303.
53 D. Caplovitz, The Working Addict (New York: City University of New York,
1976).
54 "To Pee or Not to Pee?: A Critical Review of the Addiction Research
Foundation's Best Advice on Employee Related Drug Screening", paper
presented to Ontario Federation of Labour Conference on Drug Testing,
August 17, 1987, York University, Downsview, Ontario; see now, Ellis "Urine
Testing - A Critical Appraisal", Canadian J. of Criminology, July 1988,
261, 263-264.
55 "Battling the Enemy Within", Time March 17, 1986, 52.
56 See Bruce Cunningham, Addiction Research Foundation's Presentation to
"Drug Testing in the Workplace", A Conference Sponsored by the Canadian
Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, Hamilton, Ont., Dec. 3, 1987,
proceedings cited supra note 18.
57 "Lowest accident rate at potash operation recorded after five months of
drug testing" Mine Safety and Health Reporter, Oct. 17, 1987, 197-198.
58 See "Nuclear Industry is Latest Focus of Drug Testing Debate", Workplace
Health and Job Safety Report, v. 17(7) Mar. 30, 1987, 53.
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All of these arguments are self-serving, of course, but, from time
to time, they are given an air of additional plausibility by spectacular
incidents which usually lead to speculation by the media and public
officials that drug use and health and safety are linked. Thus, in
the Amtrak-Conrail accident, which involved a train wreck near
Baltimore in which 16 people were killed, the employees working
the trains were said to have consumed marijuana.59 Such revelations
heighten public prejudices. In this context, a finding by CN rail
that one out of every six railway employees whose job affects safe
train operations is using proscribed drugs, 60 takes on ominous
significance and gives support to the proponents of employee drug
testing. But, while distortions of evidence heighten the public's
anxiety, they throw doubt on those who claim science to be on
their side. Thus, much was made of the fact that the engine drivers
had been found to have had traces of drugs in their system after
the tragic railway car crash in Hinton, Alberta which led to the
death of 23 persons. Yet, the formal investigation which followed
the Hinton rail accident identified the stressful conditions of work
of the employees as the most likely culprit.6 1
Opponents of drug testing indicate that this not only underscores
the scientific frailty of the arguments made by proponents of drug
testing but also the fact that, inasmuch as workers become impaired
by the use of drugs, they are not to be blamed. Very often, they
rightly assert, employees use drugs because of the system of work
imposed on them and that a scheme designed to identify the workers
who use drugs will not get to the root of the problems which are
sought to be solved. But, this argument cuts both ways. While it
is very appealing to us, it must be conceded that it also enables
employers to say that drug testing should be undertaken to help
them identify deficiencies in their work processes, something which
they might tell us they are more than eager to resolve. In any event,
this kind of debate, we believe, is besides the point. Both the politics
of drug testing and some bottom-line logic underlying employer/
employee relations make employer-imposed drug testing an almost
irresistible movement. The only issue is the scope of such monitoring.
Let us tease out some of the reasoning which we believe gives
pro-drug testing advocates a real advantage in the debate.
While the scientific testing available will not directly realize the
goals which employers claim to be pursuing, it is clear that the
better testing methodologies are good enough to enable employers
to claim that they will indicate the use of proscribed drugs by
employees or would-be employees. Thus, if employers can dem-
onstrate that there is a link between the use of such drugs and
59 The forensic toxicologist who reported this presence of drug, giving a boost
to drug-testing proponents, later pleaded guilty to falsifying blood-analysis
reports from 1986 train wrecks. See Abbie Hoffman, supra note 1, 123.
60 See, Globe & Mail, 28 Feb., 1988.
61 Report of the Commission of Inquiry - Hinton Train Collision. (Ottawa:
Supply and Services, December 1986)(R. Foisy, Commissioner); see 81-
105.
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matters of legitimate concern to them, they will have laid a sound
basis for mandatory drug testing. Now, it is counter-intuitive to
say that the use of drugs (such as alcohol or mind-altering substances)
by employees is not likely to affect the health and safety of those
workers, other workers and the productivity of the enterprise.
Beaumier has pointed out that most people would probably not
want to work in a place where the person entrusted with moving
a heavy load above one's head may be 'high' as the result of the
use of some drug.62 That this argument has merit is already
acknowledged by us in many ways. As seen, arbitral jurisprudence
permits employers to test their employees for their fitness to
perform.63 Moreover, it is not uncommon for government regulations
to provide that workers should be fit for their tasks. Thus, the Ontario
Occupational Health and Safety Act's Mining Regulations provide
that no person under the influence of, or carrying, intoxicating liquor,
shall enter a mine or mining plant. They also specifically forbid
anyone to be under the influence of a drug or of a narcotic substance,
unless it is medically prescribed. Further, no person is to operate
a hoist unless s/he is appropriately licensed and physically and
mentally fit to discharge the duties of a hoist operator. In order
to qualify, a hoist operator is to undergo a medical examination
every 12 months to ensure that s/he is physically and mentally
fit.64 In a similar vein, doctors are to notify the Minister of Transport
of any condition or the impairment, of a patient which could
contribute to the imperilling of safety standards. 65 Many workers
themselves appear to be in favour of drug testing where the use
of drugs by fellow employees is perceived as a threat to their safety.
Thus, 47% of surveyed railway employees thought that mandatory
drug testing was desirable and that figure rose to 77% when the
question was asked how they would feel if it had been proved
that alcohol and drug use was a problem for the railways. 66
Thus, while both the imperfection of scientific tests and the limited
information such tests can produce provide good bases for making
the argument that drug testing imposed by employers should be
carefully curtailed and watched - especially because they intrude
62 As quoted by Jim Middlemiss, "Examining Mandatory Drug Testing", The
Lawyer's Weekly, October 2, 1987, 10, 23. Note that Mr. Beaumier is a
respected scientist who works for laboratory services which do urinalyses.
Such enterprises have a lot to gain from the trend towards employee testing.
Nonetheless, the point made is a well-taken one.
63 Supra note 42. As was well said by M. Picher in another case: "It is well
established that an employer does have the right to require an employee
to submit to a medical examination where the purpose of such an examination
is to confirm that he or she is physically fit to perform assigned work in
a safe manner"; see CP Ltd, Canadian Railway Office of Arbitration, Case
No. 1703.
64 R.R.O. 1980, Reg. 694, s.14 and s. 230. This is also true of airline pilots,
see Desmond Ellis, supra note 54, 267.
65 S. 5.5, Aeronautics Act, S.C. 1985 c.28.
66 "Task Force on the Control of Drug and Alcohol Abuse,..." supra note
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so offensively into people's private lives - they do not support
the case that testing for the presence of debilitating drugs makes
no sense at all. Consequently, given the kinds of "positive" results
claimed by employers who already test their employees and the
political climate which has been created in respect of the use and
abuse of drugs in our society, it is not politically realistic to think
that there will be a total prohibition on employer-mandated drug
testing.67
4. Drug Testing and the State
One of the notable features of employer-mandated drug testing
is that the drugs to be looked for are substances which have been
proscribed by the state. The fact that the state does not want people
to use and/or sell such drugs is the result of a serious public policy
commitment. Large investigatory and enforcement organizations
have been established to prevent the use and possession and sale
of these drugs. Just as the Reagan administration began to spend
more money after its declaration of its war on drugs, so did the
Mulroney government after its declaration of an epidemic. A $210
million five-year plan was unveiled in May 1987. Most of the money
was to be spent on education in respect of drugs and the prevention
of their use, but 20% of this new money is to be directed towards
enforcement and control of use and sale.68
The state's commitment to the control of the use of proscribed
drugs is graphically illustrated by its triumphant celebration of drug
busts. Hardly a week goes by without headline news announcing
that the largest cocaine, marijuana, or heroin bust of the year, of
the decade, of the century, has been successfully completed. The
figures concerning the kilos of materials seized, the number of
wrong-doers arrested, the amount of money the drugs would have
brought on the street, are all revealed with an air of righteousness
and satisfaction. 69 There is to be no doubt left in the mind of the
public that the state wants to inhibit the use of drugs. It would
make sense, therefore, for it to try to emulate employers who impose
mandatory drug testing on their employees. The government could
send out its police forces to test people, based on its belief that
they may be in possession of drugs or be using them because the
67 The Premier of Ontario, Mr. Peterson, has been quoted as saying that he
might be willing to consider the prohibition of drug testing (Toronto Star,
Aug. 1, 1987, A2) but, frankly, this looks like political rhetoric. Occasionally,
however, it is true that an analogous employer power will be abrogated
completely. In Ontario this happened when, without much fanfare or debate,
employers were denied the right to use polygraph testing; Employment
Standards Act R.S.O. 1980, c. 137, Part XI-A, as am. 1983, c. 55 s. 2.
68 Globe and Mail, May 26, 1987, Al.
69 Hoffman, supra note 1, 37, shows how the media accept the street value
of drugs as the real value of the drugs but do not allow for the fact that
the price is an inflated one as a result of much dilution and cutting. This
creates an aura of excitement about the size of the problem, one which
Hoffman labels "hysteria".
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practice is known to be pervasive in a particular area. People could
be stopped in the street or, even more dramatically, the police could
be given permission to enter people's private houses to undertake
searches and/or tests.
While the state might very well want to do these kinds of things,
there is no question that even the mere announcement of a plan
of this kind would give rise to a great outcry. The public is not
likely to accept such behaviour by the state unless it has been
convinced that there is a pressing need for it. This can be illustrated
easily.
The R.I.D.E. programme was initiated to curb drinking and driving
in the Christmas season and is now well established in Ontario.
It permits police officers to stop drivers and to subject them to
tests to see whether they have been using alcohol. This programme
has all the difficulties which are attributed to mandatory drug testing.
It involves intrusive practices; there are some scientific validity
problems with the accuracy of the instruments used, and with the
purity of the sample, as well as difficulties in respect of the expertise
of the testing officers and with the chain of custody once a sample
is taken; moreover, as with employer drug testing, it is done on
a random basis, the police officers not having to show any kind
of reasonable cause before they stop and check drivers. A good
deal of public education was required before R.I.D.E. was accepted
as a utilitarian programme, one which was justifiable because the
overall benefits are likely to outweigh the harm done to the rights
of individuals. 70
The reason as to why it is extremely difficult for the state to
undertake mandatory random drug testing of the public is now
manifest. It requires the use of coercive powers by the state. This
threatens the liberty of the individual and thus presents a challenge
to the classical liberalism on which our political understandings
are based. Liberalism puts individuals on a pedestal vis-As-vis the
state. To give the state power which would permit the coercion
of individuals by it would challenge the core of our political
assumptions and theories, unless it could be demonstrated that such
state action was truly necessary. If this cannot be done the exercise
of this kind of state power over individuals is associated with power
wielded during the odious, unfree, days of the High Commission
and of the Star Chamber, reigns of repression not to be tolerated
by a liberal democratic society. The modern state is not to be
empowered to go on fishing expeditions to preserve itself from what
it decrees to be subversion. Any such trend raises the fear that
70 The validity of the R.I.D.E. programme was upheld in R v. Dedman (1981),
23 C.R. (3d) 228 (Ont. C.A.). Since then, spot checks have been challenged
under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada
has held that the random stopping of drivers for conducting roadside
breathalyzer tests does violate the safeguards of the Charter, but is saved
by s.1 of that document; see Hufsky v. R, S.C.C., April 28, 1988. The very
fact that such programmes are characterized as prima faciae violations of
citizen rights underscores the point being made in the text.
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we soon would be on a slippery slope on which political freedoms
would be imperilled.
These beliefs and anxieties are reflected in our criminal law
procedural rules. Intrusions into the private lives of individuals are
seen as a thin edge of the wedge: a state which can force individuals
to produce evidence against themselves, even for supposedly good
reasons, is well on the way to becoming a totalitarian one. This
line of argument suggests, strongly, that the argument of those who
oppose mandatory drug testing, especially by the state, does not
rest on a general sense of squeamishness and tenderness for the
privacy of individuals; rather it is their wish to reinforce the dominant
view of the political entente which underpins their opposition.
That it is this which underlies the debate on drug testing was
revealed nicely by the decision of Judge Sarokin in Ben Capua
v. City of Plainfield. In that case a city had decided to test, randomly,
a number of its firemen for the presence of drugs in their urine.
There had been no notice given to the firemen and some of them
resisted. This led to the dismissal of sixteen people and to the ensuing
litigation. The court ruled for the discharged firefighters and had
them permanently reinstated with back pay. The court was not
so much revolted by the idea that the employer wanted to test
its employees for the presence of drug in their system, as it was
by the manner in which it was done: mandatorily, randomly, without
warning.
"The sweeping manner which the [officials] set about to accomplish
their goals violated a firefighter's individual liberties ... the search
was unreasonable because defendants [the city] lacked any suspicion
as to that [individual] fire fighter...
The individuous effects of such mass, round-up urinalysis is that
it casually sweeps up the innocent with the guilty and willingly
sacrifices each individual's Fourth Amendment right in the name
of some larger public interest. The City of Plainfield essentially
presumed the guilt of each person tested ...
We do not permit a search of every house on a block merely because
there is reason to believe that one contains evidence of criminal
activity. No prohibition more significantly distinguishes our demo-
cracy from a totalitarian government than that which bars warrant-
less searches and seizures.7
It is this unease which has led most courts in the United States
which have had to deal with the issue to hold that publicly employed
persons may refuse such employer-initiated tests. In thirteen out
of seventeen cases in which the employer was the state, courts
have found in favour of restricting the employer's right. In one
71 (1986), 643 F. Supp. 1507, (D.N.J.) The quoted passages appear on pp.
15 16, 15 17, 15 11 respectively. Recently, a district court judge in Brampton,
Ont., ruled that random searches of airport luggage for narcotics violated
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. He was quoted as saying that he could
not think of a more fundamental breach of justice; Globe & Mail, 21 Jan.,
1988, A8. That employers might be able to engage in such searches legally
is potentially embarrassing.
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important federal appellate decision, the court decided, by a majority
of 2 to 1, that a programme, which required employees seeking
promotions to positions in the customs' bureau service, many of
which were sensitive because they involved drug interdiction, to
urinate into a cup while a government agent waited and listened
outside the stall, was a valid programme.72 The Supreme Court
of the United States announced that it will hear an appeal from
this decision. 73
What has become clear from this discussion is that it is very
difficult for the state to impose its power on individual citizens
in the way that employers do when they seek to initiate mandatory
drug testing in their workplace. Liberal scholars and political
activists cannot countenance the idea that a private sector employer
may be able to test for drugs,74 without restraint, when the state
certainly cannot be permitted to do so. This explains, in part, some
of the rather odd arguments which swirl around the debates about
mandatory drug testing.
Opponents of drug testing frequently talk about the issue in human
rights' terms. It is clear that they do not use the term "human rights"
in the sense that is commonly referred to when the concerns are
those raised under the aegis of human rights' legislation. That kind
of legislation deals with the prohibition of discrimination which
denies equality of access and opportunity. In the employment setting,
human rights' legislation fetters the employer's right to act capri-
ciously and whimsically. An employer must treat people alike,
regardless of gender, age, creed, nationality, place of origin, marital
status, and so forth, provided that they can do the job which he
has designed. It is always an answer for an employer to say that
the people whom he refuses to hire or to retain in employment
are not capable of doing the job as well as others; his productive
goals are to hold sway, provided they are not found to be tainted
by discriminatory inklings. This is clearly reflected by the fairly
recent innovations in protecting differently abled people. Human
rights' agencies are now requiring that the employer make some
accommodation so that people who are physically handicapped in
some way or another will still be able to do the task for which
72 National Treasury Employees Union, Chapter 168 v. Von Raab, Commissioner
United States Customs Service 808 F. 2d 1057 (5th Circ.) 1987.
73 New York Times, March 1, 1988. Since this was written, the War on Drugs
in the U.S.A. has been given more prominence by the Bush Administration.
This will put pressure on the judiciary to support employer-mandated drug
testing, even when initiated by the state as employer.
74 There is some movement in the U.S. courts to prevent private sector employers
from imposing drug tests on their employees. In California, a preliminary
injunction was granted on the basis that that State's privacy law was violated
by such practices; see New York Times, June 11, 1988, 6. More recently,
the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that it will hear a case questioning the
constitutional right of private employers to implement mandatory drug
testing. Unsurprisingly, the case involves the Consolidated Rail Corporation,
known as Conrail, which, after its disaster in 1987 (text, supra note 59),
imposed drug testing on its employees; New York Times, Oct. 4., 1988.
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they want to be employed. But, so far, the employer has not been
asked to do more than to provide "reasonable" accommodation.
The idea is that his productive needs are to be respected if his
motives are not suspect. On this basis drug impairment might very
well be a justifiable reason for discriminating against an employee,
or would-be employee. Appeals to "human rights' arguments by
opponents of drug testing then, will not be obviously persuasive.
It can be surmised that when opponents of mandatory drug testing
discuss the matter as if it raised a human rights' issue, it is likely
that they are not using the language in the context of the anti-
discrimination laws summarized above. Rather, they are invoking
the expression "human rights' in the sense of rights which individual
citizens, as sovereign political entities, are to have vis-A-vis the
state. This is an implicit acknowledgment that private sector
employers possess state-like powers. 75 The question that is raised,
therefore, by the employment of this "human rights-type" language
is, once again, how it is that private sector employers can overcome
individual liberties by mechanisms which, if employed by the state,
would give rise to revulsion and to claims that the state would
be overriding the political rights of citizens. The answer to this
vexing question is to be found in the essence of employer/employee
relationships.
5. The Source of the Power of Private Sector Employers and the
Need to Hide It
The conventional assumption is that employees voluntarily enter
into an agreement with an employer and that the nature of the
terms and conditions to which they agree is, therefore, voluntary.
While it is understood that the lack of property ownership robs
employees of bargaining power, it is felt that, in contemporary
capitalism, this imbalance has been mediated a great deal. The
state stipulates minimum conditions which employers must meet
and encourages collective bargaining which offsets the employers'
strength. But, this commonly held view of the employment rela-
tionship falsifies concrete conditions. The difference between an
employer and an employee was, and still is, that an employer really
has a choice whether or not to invest his property. By definition,
the ownership of property means that he does not need to use it
to reproduce himself and his necessities. By definition, a worker
is a propertyless person and must work for someone in order to
reproduce herself and her necessities. Thus, while a worker may
sometimes have a choice as to whom she shall sell her services
and, if she is lucky enough to be part of a bargaining trade union,
7 In part, the expression "human rights" may be used by mandatory drug
test opponents because it is also felt to be appropriate in that that expression
is often used in respect of torture used by state agencies in various parts
of the world. The invasion of the human body and the accompanying indignity
associated with drug testing throw up images which suggest analogies with
the abuse of people's bodies by repressive regimes. But this is an emotive
approach.
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may have some leverage in the ensuing bargaining, the fact is that
she must work for an employer.76 This lack of equivalence between
the starting positions of the employer and the employee has not
been redressed in any serious way. Moreover, our law always has
upheld and fortified the employer's needs. This is a necessity for
the employer because what the employee sells is her labour power.
This is an unquantifiable, unusable thing until it is translated into
labour which produces a value. It is only at that point that the
employer is in a position to make profit. Therefore, there must
be a mechanism to translate raw labour power into concrete labour
or value. 77
The inequality in bargaining power takes on concrete form when
the employer makes a series of decisions about work conditions
when setting up an enterprise. 78 This gives the employer the initial
control over technology, processes, hours of work, intensity of work,
levels of skill, etc. For workers to change any of that, they must
win concessions at the bargaining table or in the legislative process.
But this has been made difficult.
In the first place, thejudiciary, as the institution which is to protect
private property rights, assisted employers by developing a doctrine
that every contract of employment had implied terms unless they
were specifically altered. These implied terms included the doctrines
that employees had a duty to obey their employers, a duty to exercise
skill, a duty to be of good faith and fidelity to their employers.
These doctrines enabled employers to command employees. In turn,
this permitted them to translate labour power into productive labour.
With the advent of collective bargaining and the acceptance of
the legitimacy of the collective use of economic power by workers,
it might have been expected that the underlying assumptions which
permitted the common law to imply the terms it did would be
forgotten. But, grievance arbitrators, that is, those functionaries who
spell out the parameters of employer/employee relationships arising
out of collective bargaining, have made the same assumptions
common law judges did. There is still a duty imposed on employees
to obey, to exercise a reasonable level of skill, to be of good faith
and fidelity. The credo of arbitrators is that
"an industrial plant is not a debating society. Its object is production.
When a controversy arises, production cannot wait for exhaustion
of the grievance procedure. While that procedure is being pursued,
76 C.B. MacPherson, "Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's Freedom"
in MacPherson - Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval (New York: O.U.P.,
1973), 143; Robert Heiibroner, The Nature and Logic of Capitalism (New
York: Norton, 1985).
77 For a more detailed consideration of this argument, see H.J. Glasbeek, 'The
Contract of Employment at Common Law" in J. Anderson & M. Gunderson
- Union - Management Relations in Canada (Don Mills, Ont.: Addison-
Wesley, 1982) ch. 3.
78 H.J. Glasbeek, "A Role for Criminal Sanctions in Occupational Health and
Safety" in New Developments in Employment Law, Meredith Memorial
Lectures 1988 (Cowansville, Que.: Les Editions Yvon Blais Inc., 1989).
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production must go on. And someone must have the authority to
direct the manner in which it is to go on until the controversy is
settled. That authority is vested in supervision. It must be vested
there because the responsibility for production is also vested there;
and responsibility must be accompanied by authority. It is fairly vested
there because the grievance procedure is capable of adequately
recompensing employees for abuse of authority by supervision".7 9
This rule, known by labour relations' cognoscenti as the "obey now,
grieve later" rule, enables employers to conduct the enterprise that
they own in the way that they desire, at least to the extent that
workers have not fettered their right to do so. It is this which explains
the employer's power to discipline employees in the way that was
set out in section 2 of this paper. As was seen, the employer's
power to discipline is not the same as the employer's power to
discharge. The employer's power to discharge has been modified
by the arbitral right to tailor remedies which the arbitrators see
as better suited to the maintenance of stable production and good
industrial practices than is the unfettered right of employers to do
as they wish with errant employees.
As a result, the employer now has to show that he has reasonable
cause to punish an employee, that he has not made demands which
are not acceptable given the industrial norms. This limiting of overall
employer power is seen as one of the great advances of legitimated
collective bargaining. In large measure it is this which permits the
argument to be made that the relationship between employers and
employees is a truly voluntary one, not one which is the result
of coercion by one party of the other. By softening the more brutal
impacts inherent in the fundamental inequality of bargaining power
- as perpetuated and consolidated by the common law regime
- it has become possible to assert that the relationship between
employers and employees is one of free agreement, one in which
a consensus exists. The idea that the interests of employers and
employees are in fundamental conflict has been pushed into the
background. This is why unilaterally imposed employer drug testing
presents a problem.
If employers were to be permitted to subject their employees
to the indignity and oppression of urinalysis it would draw attention
to the fact that the prerogative of management has been far less
limited than conventional wisdom always assures society it has been.
Employers exercising this right would be making naked what has
been relatively successfully hidden since the advent of collective
79 Ford Motor Company (1944), 3 L.A. 779 (Shulman). For remarkably similar
language used by a common law court, see Er parte Fry [1954], W.L.R.
730. There a court was asked to interfere (by way of certiorari) with the
discipline imposed by a Fire Brigade on a disobedient employee. The court
refused because the employer was not acting judicially or quasi-judicially.
Lord Goddard, C.J. said, 733: "It seems to me impossible to say that a
chief officer of a force which is governed by discipline .... in exercising
disciplinary authority over [an employee] is acting ... judicially ... any
more than a schoolmaster is when he is exercising disciplinary powers over
his pupils." (Emphasis added).
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bargaining with its attendant grievance arbitration jurisprudence
and mediation practices. It is in this sense that we can understand
the almost instinctive opposition of liberal scholars and policy-
makers to private sector mandatory drug testing. It would be
preferable not to have to bring the remaining huge inequality in
bargaining power and control to the forefront. For this reason, if
employer-mandated drug testing cannot be stopped, we should
expect that there will be attempts to confine managerial power
to impose drug tests, in much the same way that arbitrators have
limited the employers' powers to fire and discipline workers. The
likelihood is that grievance arbitrators will require an employer
who wants to test his employees to show he has reasonable grounds
to believe that an employee's faculties are impaired while working
and that this impairment presents a danger to the physical safety
of that employee, to that of other employees, to that of the public,
or to the welfare of the ongoing enterprise. In addition, it may
well come to be that the employer might be forced to use specific
kinds of testing to ensure scientific validity.
But, there will still be many problems: will the employer be able
to argue that there is an objective reason for instituting mandatory
and even random drug testing when drug use is pervasive in a
geographic area or amongst a group of people? 80 Will an employer
be able to demand that employees tel! him of drug taking by fellow
employees? Will employers be persuaded not to take disciplinary
action against drug-using employees but, rather, to set up assistance
plans (as has been done in respect of people who have been found
to abuse alcohol) and, if this is done, will this mean that employees
in any such programme will be on some kind of probation, requiring
them to be monitored? 81 If these kinds of limitations on employers
develop as a result of union struggles and arbitral decision-making,
as we think will happen, it is quite possible that similar legislative
limitations will be imposed in due course. There are some indications
that these kinds of developments will occur. As has been noted,
Transport Canada has issued a report saying that it considers drug
use a very serious problem and that, because it is entrusted with
the public's welfare, it is willing to impose drug testing on both
would-be employees and on its employees, with appropriate safe-
guards. 82 Similarly, the Canada Labour Code was recently amended
to permit searches of mine employees and to force such employees
to undergo testing in some circumstances. This legislation has not
yet been proclaimed. 83
80 It is on this basis that the U.S. military is able to impose mandatory drug
testing.
81 For an example of this kind of limitation on employer power, see the 1985
San Francisco Ordinance which amended the Municipal Code to this effect,
as reproduced in Hoffman - supra note 1, 126-27.
82 "Task Force on the Control of Alcohol and Drug Abuse...," supra note
16.
83 S. 1 of Bill C-124, An Act to Amend the Canada Labour Code, c.33. This
Bill received Royal Assent on 21 July, 1988, but s. 1 was to be proclaimed
on a date to be fixed.
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Thus, there will be attempts to fetter what is the real power
of private sector employers, a power that is, in political terms, not
readily exercisable by the state. The limitations which we see likely
as being imposed on this employer power will be of a kind which
will limit private employers no more than the state would be if
it chose to exercise its awesome power and seek to compel people
to submit themselves to drug searches and tests. This in itself tells
us a lot about the real power of private wealth owners in our society.
6. Drug Testing as Part of a Larger Phenomenon
The final question to be addressed is why it is that employers
are motivated to impose this kind of intrusive testing on their
employees. After all, it is calculated to raise hackles and to lead
to conflict and, as we have argued, it presents a problem for the
dominant ideology: it may reveal the real shape of the emperor.
A. Mandatory Drug Testing and Foucault's Carceral Society.
One of the more intriguing aspects of the mandatory drug testing
controversy is that the drugs which are being tested for are all
drugs which have been proscribed by the state. That is, the drugs
involved are not necessarily the only drugs which might impair
people nor those which are the most dangerous. The state has not
chosen to proscribe those which are the most harmful.84 All sorts
of reasons have been advanced as to why drugs have been proscribed
from time to time. For example, Comack,85 argues that the first
Canadian drug legislation can be best explained as an outcome
of class conflict which was resolved by turning the white working
class against Chinese workers in British Columbia. Whereas Cook, 86
another conflict analyst, sees the origin of drug legislation as part
of a labelling exercise undertaken by the state. Whatever the
84 It is obvious that alcohol and tobacco are just as dangerous to human beings,
cause just as much economic havoc and are likely to debilitate people far
more than most of the proscribed drugs. Hoffman, supra note 1, 53, provides
the following table:
ANNUAL SUBSTANCE-RELATED FATALITIES
(Source: U.S. Bureau of Mortality Statistics and the
National Institute of Drug Abuse, 1979 estimates.)
Substance Estimated Deaths
Tobacco 200,000 - 300,000
Alcohol 30,000 - 130,000
Licit Drug Overdose 8,000 - 10,000
Illicit Drug Overdose 1,000 - 3,600
85 E. Comack, "The Origins of Canadian Drug Legislation: Labelling versus
Class Analysis", in T. Fleming (ed.) - The New Criminologies in Canada;
Crime, State and Contror' (Toronto: O.U.P., 1985) 65.
86 S. Cook, "Canadian Narcotics Legislation, 1908-1923: A Conflict Model
Interpretation", (1969), Can. Rev. of Soc. and Anthro. 6(l):36.
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explanation, it seems clear that the purposes underlying the creation
of drug-use crimes involve more than attempts at reflecting a
consensually agreed-upon morality.87 This raises the question of
the contemporary state's objectives, both in this sphere of pros-
cription and when it criminalizes conduct generally. Once the state's
role and objectives are identified, it will become possible to ask
more meaningful questions about the role played by private em-
ployers when they engage in parallel activity, that is, when they
seek to proscribe the use of drugs by their employees and attempt
to police these rules. For the remainder of this discussion we rely
a great deal on the analysis provided by Foucault of the uses made
by the state of criminal law and associated regulatory mechanisms. 88
According to Foucault, it is the state's function to help the powerful
retain power by disciplining those in society whose cooperation
and labour is needed by the rulers. He demonstrates how there
has been an evolution from a crudely repressive society which used
direct demonstration, by, say, the public ritual killing of non-
conformists by the rulers' champions, to one which makes it clear
to citizens that, should they deviate in any way whatsoever from
the accepted norms, they will be disciplined by the state. As the
norms being so enforced are those which suit the people in power,
the purpose of such discipline is to encourage the citizens to accept
lines of established authority without question. This eliminates the
need for the powerful to fight the powerless on an on-going,
continuous, basis. This conceptualization of the state role makes
the jailhouse an important tool. It shows people what will happen
to them unless they accept the norms which the state wishes them
to follow. In addition, as only the undeserving will be so treated,
it is made clear to people that they all will be watched.89 Foucault
understood that, if people knew that they were being watched by
those with power to punish them, there would be less and less need
to resort to jailing. He argued, therefore, that continuous surveillance
by the authorities was an effective disciplinary method. The creation
of the notion of delinquency had permitted such on-going monitoring
87 Other explanations include competitive wars between the patent medicine
industry and pharmacists and physicians; see G. Murray, "Cocaine Use in
the Era of Social Reform: The Natural History of a Social Problem in Canada,
1880-1911 " (1987), 2 Cart. J Law & Soc., 29. For more conventional analyses
of the origins of drug legislation, see Solomon & Radison "The Evolution
of Non-Medical Opiate Use in Canada, Part I, 1870-1929", (1976-77), Drug
Forum 5; 237; M. Green, "The History of Canadian Narcotics Control"
(1979), 37 U of T. Fac.LRev. 42; G. Trosov, "History of Opium and Narcotic
Drug Legislation in Canada" (1962), 4 Crim. LQ. 274.
88 The principal text referred to is Discipline and Punish- The Birth of the Prison
(Trans. A. Sheridan). (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
89 In a complementary work, Melossi and Pavarini argue that jail was an
extension of the factory. Their idea of the jail is that it was not there so
much to punish wrong-doers as it was to help the reproduction of acceptable
workers on behalf of property owners; see D. Melossi and M. Pavarini,
The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System (Trans. Glynis
Cousin), (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1981).
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which, he noted, would lead to "generalized policing ... [which]
constitutes a means of perpetual surveillance of the population: an
apparatus that makes it possible to supervise, through the delinquents
themselves, the whole social field". 90 He envisaged that while,
initially, this kind of surveillance and monitoring worked best in
conjunction with a prison, soon a carceral archipelago would
develop. Foucault pointed to the increasing use of institutions such
as poor houses, orphanages, workers' estates, and the like, and
predicted that more and more of the monitoring and surveillance
would take place within the community itself rather than in state
institutions. This is certainly happening in Canada.
To show that this is the case, Michael Mandel has developed
some remarkable data. He points to the fact that the last decade
or so has been hailed as a period of state-promoted decarceration,
but notes that Canada has incarcerated as many people as it ever
has.91 At the same time, however, Mandel shows that Canada has
more people under formal surveillance now than at any other time
in its history. There are three times as many people under such
surveillance as there are people in custody. This astounding extension
of control over people's lives has been achieved by an intricate
system of orders devised by courts and state authorities while giving
effect to the so-called decarceration policies. There are probation
orders which may require people to attend hostels - where they
are supervised; roughly 45 percent of people on probation are
released on condition that they carry out community services -
where they are also supervised. A parole system exists which requires
supervision and monitoring of the jail population and of the released
parolees. A system of halfway houses has been established; day
parole has been invented, as well as other mechanisms which subject
parolees to continuous surveillance. In addition, conditional dis-
charges are given; by definition, they require supervision of the
dischargees. Pardons, when given, provide another excuse for
supervision because they may be revoked. More recently, the
Canadian Bar Association has recommended that people who are
released from jails should be equipped with an ankle or a wrist
strap which will tell a surveillance agent if the ex-prisoner has
strayed beyond the limits of his "freedom" zone. A similar scheme
has been experimented with and may be implemented in British
Columbia and is well established in Florida.92
90 Supra note 88, 281.
91 M. Mandel, "Decarceration: The Rise and Fall of Prison Populations" in
M. Mandel, Readings in Criminology 1987, (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law
School), (unpublished teaching materials available on request). The com-
parison he makes is between the number of prisoners per 100,000 of
population in given periods. The figures of the contemporary level of
incarceration are all the more remarkable because the previous equivalent
high was recorded during the Great Depression and contemporary Canadian
penologists espouse their preference for a decarceration policy. The argu-
mentation in this part of the paper relies heavily on the reasoning, as well
as the data, offered by M. Mandel in the Readings cited above.
92 Toronto Star, Aug. 20, 1988, Al, D2.
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As a consequence, many people are subject to direct surveillance.
Often the state is able to enlist community leaders to participate
in its surveillance of the people who have been labelled delinquents.
Santos93 has argued that the state, by reducing itself - in this case
through decarceration - has in fact increased its reach by putting
some of its control functions into the hands of private supervisors
and monitors. The carceral archipelago is growing.
There is a close parallel between the reasons for the monitoring
and surveillance of employees by employers and that of the citizenry
at large by the state. This can be seen from the congruence in
language used by penologists and arbitrators. When Fauteux re-
commended decarceration in 1956, he justified the making of
probationary orders in the following terms:
"It [a probationary order] is a form of correctional treatment
deliberately chosen by the Court because there is reason to believe
that this method will protect the interests of society while meeting,
at the same time, the needs of the offender. Probation permits the
offender to lead a normal life in the community and enables him
to avoid the inevitably disturbing effects of imprisonment. It makes
it possible for him to continue his normal associations and activities
while he receives the constructive assistance of supervision and
guidance by a trained probation officer." 94
There can be no doubt about the nature of the argument made
by Fauteux: people were to be put on probation to teach them
how to behave and to conform.
Labour relations' arbitrators have developed an analogous ap-
proach and use similar language. They have crafted and finely
calibrated a series of sanctions in respect of wrongful behaviour
by employees. Both the terminology and the precepts are eye-
catchingly similar to those of the penologists. Thus, the well-known
labour arbitrator/theoretician Adams has written that corrective type
discipline:
"[Sihould be tailored to allow the offender to learn from his
mistake.... It ... identifies those employees who are unlikely to
profit from another opportunity.... It ... ensures that those who
abide by the rules will not be disadvantaged. It preserves the morale
of the law abiding citizen. A final purpose ... is to achieve con-
formity to workplace norms by permanently removing the offender
from his job and replacing him with someone who will conform." 95
While it is something of a digression, it is nonetheless pertinent
to note here that the language and ideas used in the two spheres
- prisons and factories - are similar in other respects as well.
93 "Law & Community: The Changing Nature of State Power in Late Cap-
italism" (1985), Int. J. of Soc. of Law, 8:379.
94 Report of a Committee on the Remission Service (Department of Justice of
Canada, 1956 (Fauteux Report), 13.
95 G. Adams, Grievance Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Study of the Concepts
of Industrial Discipline and Their Results. (Kingston: Industrial Relations
Centre, Queen's University 1979), 27-28.
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We began the paper by pointing out that the employer's right to
control his workforce allows him to discipline and punish his
employees. When he does so, he uses those very terms: discipline
and punish. Workers' non-conformist behaviour, that is, behaviour
which the employer defines as not being consonant with his
productive needs, is referred to as an "offence". Moreover, the
punishment which is imposed can be very severe. It is punishment
of the kind which real criminals might expect to suffer. For instance,
if a worker who makes $20,000 a year, has been discharged from
work and is subsequently reinstated by a grievance arbitrator who
felt that the employer had a cause for discipline but not one for
discharge, the employee may lose pay for a lengthy period during
which he was not employed. Thus, not untypically, an employee
may lose four to six months' pay, a penalty of $6,600 to $10,000.
This kind of "fine" at least equals, and likely exceeds, any that
could be imposed by the state for an analogous offence. 96 Inevitably,
it is well understood that the employer is really exercising state-
like criminal powers when he is disciplining and punishing his
workers. This helps explain why some of the opponents of mandatory
drug testing make their arguments in the way they do and why
the idea of employers imposed drug testing raises their ire. Thus:
the imposition of drug tests on employees is often characterized
as a potential abuse of the privilege against self-incrimination of
individuals. Similarly, it is often said that such drug tests are
repugnant because they involve the assumption that people are guilty
before they have been proved to be so by an appropriate process
and, therefore, the presumption of innocence will be undermined.
This argument has its strongest persuasive power vis-A-vis random
testing, that is, when there is no objective basis for the belief that
something is wrong and needs to be controlled. It has resonance
precisely because the result of a finding that an individual has
wrongfully used drugs will lead to punishment, in the same way
as it would if she had been criminally convicted. Not surprisingly,
it has been lawyers who make some of the strongest arguments
against mandatory drug testing and do so precisely because the
scientific reliability of the processes for evidence-gathering are so
suspect. This makes the possibility of punishment offensive, in the
same way that to convict someone on the basis of an illegally
obtained confession is deemed offensive.97
There are other parallels between the use of criminal power by
the state and employer-mandated drug testing. In respect of the
96 For an elaboration of this argument, see H.J. Glasbeek - The Utility of
Model Building ... supra note 43. It suffices to note that an employer may
be fined no more - and often less - for a violation of a health and safety
standard which leads to the death of a worker.
97 See the argument of the Canadian Bar Association - Ontario Branch, supra
note 19. It should be noted that the recommendation made in that report
to ban the use of employer-mandated drug testing was ultimately rejected
when it was offered as a resolution at the mid-Winter meeting of the national
body of the CBA in February, 1988, see The National, March 1988.
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proscription of drugs by the state, Ericson9 8 has argued that one
of the benefits, from the state's point of view, of making drugs
illegal is that it enables the police to stop, seize, survey and monitor
individual citizens. The potential of surveillance of the public is
enhanced and this enhances the state's control over the citizenry.
Similarly, if employers are allowed to check their employees for
drug use/abuse, even if this right is restricted by the requirement
that there be an objective basis for such testing, they will be entitled
to monitor the performance of their workforce even more closely
than they do now. The effect which increasingly sophisticated and
legitimated surveillance will have on the workforce cannot be
underestimated. Surveillance, generally, has a chilling effect on the
ability of those under scrutiny to express themselves freely. As the
Labour Relations Board of Ontario has noted, "surveillance has
become a recognized technique of behaviour modification. "99 Askin
has argued that workers who are conscious of being watched
experience heightened fear:
"... apprehension is an act of anxiety that subjects feel when they
are being evaluated. It leaves the individuals to behave in a manner
that will win a positive evaluation on the person who is judging
him....
The psychological consequence of concern over social evaluation
(induced through awareness that once behaviour is under surveillance)
is the arousal of anxiety. This anxiety raises the threshold for
expression of all behaviours which could be judged as non-normative,
deviant, atypical, or political dissident."' 00
The concrete advantage which employers will derive from mon-
itoring and surveillance carried on under the guise of justified
checking for drug impairment is manifest. It is the same kind of
benefit which the state seeks to obtain from its surveillance practices.
Once again, the parallel between private sector and state objectives
becomes apparent. Moreover, if private sector employers can do
what the state would find difficult to do and exercise this power
for the kind of reasons which, in the first place, led us to fetter
the state lest it oppresses us unduly, it is likely to bring out the
fact that employment relations are not based on voluntary agreement.
The private employer would not be able to do at least as much
as the state can do, or even more, if there did not remain an imbalance
of power which permits the employer to exploit his workers
whenever he wishes to do so.
98 Richard V. Ericson - Reproducing Order: A Study of Police Patrol Work
(Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1982), 164-166.
99 K-Mart Canada Ltd (Peterborough) [19811, O.L.R.B. Rep. 60.
100 Askin, "Surveillance: The Social Science Perspective" (1972), 4 Columbia
Human Rights' Law Rev. 59, 73. The idea that continuous monitoring and
surveillance has a chilling effect on people's behaviour is well understood
by labour relations boards which watch out for such employer behaviour
when workers seek to form legitimate trade unions.
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B. Some Concrete Reasons for the Desire of Some Employers to
Impose Drug Testing on their Employees
Given the undesirable revelatory nature of mandatory drug testing,
it is not easy to see why employers would embark on such an
enterprise, given that it is not likely to lead to much greater
improvement in work performance. That is, if the argument made
in this paper is right, it might be expected that thoughtful employers
would not wish to push for mandatory drug testing. Yet, in the
U.S., they are doing so with zeal and, in Canada, there are some
stirrings to this effect. In this final section some instrumental reasons
are offered as to why this dangerous course might be pursued by
individual employers.
(i) There is the ideological impetus given by neo-conservative
governments, particularly in the U.S. and more latterly in
Canada. Ellis points out that these kinds of governments
routinely co-opt crime and employ it as a political resource.
He notes that, in the U.S., the Reagan administration has
done so successfully: "[u]nder the guise of dealing with a
significant social/medical problem, opposition to homo-
sexuals, Haitians, blacks, street criminals, AIDS, drug use,
and employee autonomy can be mounted". 0 1 Employers who
like to exercise power are encouraged when their instinctive
desires are legitimated by governmental signals which tell
them that they are not just being self-indulgent but, rather,
that they are acting in the public interest.
(ii) It is possible that some employers want to ensure that their
employees not use drugs because they really care about the
safety of those employees and that of any others whom they
might hurt. But, the history of occupational health and safety
makes it clear that employers seldom have been at the
forefront of the struggles to improve occupational health and
safety conditions. 02 This, then, cannot be an important aspect
"01 D. Ellis, supra note 54, 268. Ellis notes the hypocrisy of these neo-
conservative tactics. He argues that it is not the lifestyle to which the rulers
object, but it is the people who are identified with it who are the focus
of the "War on Drugs". After all, he comments, many members of the
conservative hierarchy use drugs, including corporate executives. In addition,
it is fairly well-known that these conservative governments and their secret
agencies use drugs and the drug trade as part of their foreign policy
stratagems; see Penny Lemoux - In Banks We Trust (New York: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1984); Elaine Sciolino and Stephen Engelberg, "The
Traffic in Drugs, America's Global War", New York Times, Apr. 10, 1988,
1. (The first of three articles).
102 Although, occasionally, some of them will participate in reform movements;
see, generally,V. Navarro, "The Labour Process and Health: A Historical
Materialist Interpretation" (1982), 12 Int'l J. Health Serv. 5; C. Noble,
Liberalism at Work- The Rise and Fall of the OSHA (Philadelphia: Temple
U, 1986); E. Tucker, "Making the Workplace 'Safe' in Capitalism: The
Enforcement of Factory Legislation in Nineteenth Century Ontario" (1988),
21 LabourLe Travail 45.
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of the drive towards employer-mandated drug testing, al-
though the very fact this argument has any plausibility at
all aids the cause of those who support this development.
(iii) A better argument to help explain the employers' desire to
impose drug testing on employees is that it is another version
of blaming the victim. By dramatizing that drug abuse exists,
indeed, is rampant, and that it may be connected (even if
this is not so clearly established) to workplace injuries and
diseases, a suggestion is being made that much of occupational
health and safety harm is the outcome of imprudent employee
behaviour. Both the fact that there is no clear connection
between drug use/abuse and occupational health and safety
harm and the fact that much drug use and abuse may arise
out of the stressful conditions imposed by employers should
make this line of argument rebuttable. But, this will require
a good deal of education, particularly as one tempting way
of making the counter argument, viz., that there is no
connection between drug use and safety, is counter-intuitive.
(iv) Economics may impel employers to subject employees to
drug testing. Here there are two sets of arguments. On the
one hand, the mandatory drug testing programmes have
gained momentum at a time when employers have been faced
with a weakened union movement and an increasingly large
army of reserve labour. As a result, facing competitive
pressures, employers have been less interested in pretending
that they care about their workers' plight; increasingly they
have engaged in massive layoffs as a means of economic
rationalization. 10 3 Overall, they feel less of a need to accom-
modate workers' concerns. In this kind of economic circum-
stance, the more hardheaded and autocratic employers are
not persuaded by arguments that the physical intrusion which
mandatory drug testing presents will lead to the kind of worker
opposition and militance which they ought to fear.
The second kind of argument based on economics is the
fact that, with the development of new technologies, many
workers are asked to handle very expensive and delicate
equipment. Mistakes by one employee can cause a great deal
of damage to production. In these circumstances, it makes
sense to ensure that these centrally placed workers are not
in any way impaired.
Testing for drugs makes sense to employers who are seeking
immediate concrete gains. Moreover, it makes sense in a world
where the exercise of discipline and control is vital.
103 D. Drache and H. Glasbeek, "The New Fordism in Canada: Capital's
Offensive, Labour's Opportunity", (1989), 27 Osgoode Hall Law Journal
517.
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7. Summation
1. There is a real anxiety about the use/abuse of certain drugs
in contemporary North America.
2. In part this anxiety has been fostered by employers; in part
employers' awareness of it has been increased by external
factors.
3. Some employers encouraged by the general climate and per-
ceiving the potential for some tangible productive advantages
seek to impose mandatory drug testing on employees and would-
be employees.
4. Employers who choose this route find justification and support
in the fact that the exercise of this kind of power over their
workers already has been legitimated.
5. The nature of drug testing is such, however, that the exercise
of this power by employers makes it clear how real their power
is and how contentious the conventional wisdom, which posits
the state (rather than private property owners) as the enemy
of individuals, is.
6. As a result, opposition to employer-mandated drug testing often
comes from those who support the conventional wisdom.
7. One of the arguments of this opposition is that the drug testing
technology is not reliable enough to warrant the interference
with employees' privacy which drug testing entails.
8. Another such argument is that employer-mandated drug testing
would permit employers to treat employees as guilty before
there was proof to this effect. This is characterized as offensive
to our social norms. The full implications of this argument are
not pursued.
9. These implications are that the private sector employers will
be exercising, directly, the power to discipline and punish in
the way that Foucault has argued the state does on behalf of
the rulers of any society.
10. Employer-mandated drug testing is part of the trend towards
privatization of discipline of the ruled. Employer-mandated drug
testing is, in a sense, a microcosm of the larger terrain of struggle
between capital and labour and reveals some of its (usually)
carefully hidden features.
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